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U.S. Ballistic Missile Defense,
NORAD and the
Canada Conundrum
Joel Sokolsky
hen newly sworn in U.S. Secretary of
Defense Chuck Hagel announced in early
2013 that in response to the growing threat
from North Korea, 14 new Ballistic Missile Defense
(BMD) interceptors would be added to the 30 already
in place in California and Alaska, the Wall Street Journal
called it “one of the biggest switcheroos of the Obama
Presidency.” Whether the administration is prepared
to go much further still is not clear. A September
2012 report by the U.S. National Research Council
(Making Sense of Ballistic Missile Defense) called for a
gradual buildup of the system, specifically mentioning
Fort Drum, NY and northern Maine as possible
BMD locations.
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While the deployment of more BMD
interceptors will be a purely American
decision, such an expansion will have
implications for U.S. defense relations with Canada. This is because of
the existence of the North American
Aerospace Defense Command
(NORAD), a unique “bi-national”
command staffed with both American
and Canadian military personnel
which, since 1957, has had responsibility for the aerospace defense of
both countries. Originally postured
to defend the continent against the
threat of Soviet long-range bombers by providing a single command
for the operational control of assigned
American and Canadian air defense
forces, NORAD in subsequent years
has taken on additional responsibility
for warning of ballistic missile attack
and space surveillance.
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But NORAD never had a real operational BMD function. During the Cold
War, the United States did not deploy it
and there was no capability to intercept Soviet nuclear-armed ground and
sea-launched Intercontinental Ballistic
Missiles (ICBMs and SLBMs) before
they reached their military and urban
targets in the U.S. or Canada. The
“defense” of North America lay instead
in the deterrent power of the American
strategic-nuclear offensive capability.

The absence of an American BMD
system meant that Canada, although
involved through NORAD in missile
warning, could eschew a role in BMD,
a situation that ref lected Canadian
policy preferences.
With the advent of new post-Cold War
missile threats and the deployment by
the United States of a limited BMD
system directed against North Korea
and other “rogue” states, the U.S.
has now moved to deploy a limited
BMD system of radars and interceptors. These capabilities were not placed
under NORAD’s operational control,
although as the command responsible
for the continent’s aerospace defense
this might have been seen as a logical
step. Here again, the government in
Ottawa has resisted direct participation
in BMD, and adjustments were made at
NORAD to accommodate Canadian
reluctance. With Washington now set
to expand its BMD system, including
along the border with Canada, Ottawa’s
position may no longer be tenable and
as such the future of NORAD as a binational command is in question.

Speaking in Kingston, Ontario
in 1938, President Franklin
Roosevelt declared that
the United States would not
stand idly by if Canada were
ever threatened.
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Missile Defense and the
Obligations of a “Good and
Friendly Neighbour”
Speaking in Kingston, Ontario in
1938, President Franklin Roosevelt
declared that the United States would
not stand idly by if Canada were ever
threatened. In response, then Prime
Minister W. L. Mackenzie King said
that Canada’s obligation as a “good and
friendly neighbour” was to see to it that
enemy forces did not attack the U.S. by
land, sea or air by way of Canada. The
essence of the bilateral security relationship—its close, friendly and cooperative nature notwithstanding—is
that Canada cannot become a security
liability for the U.S.
This obligation took on new meaning after World War Two as the Soviet
Union developed atomic weapons and
a long-range bomber force capable of
f lying over the North Pole en route to
the U.S. Suddenly, Canada became,
in the words of American Secretary
of State John Foster Dulles, a “very
important piece of real estate.” Canada
understood and readily embraced its
new position. As the Cold War deepened in the late 1940s and early 1950s,
Ottawa joined with Washington to create a strong western deterrent in Europe
through the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization (NATO) and in North
America in the development of radar
lines in the Canadian north backed
by interceptor aircraft to provide for
continental air defence. In 1957, these
combined efforts were brought together
under a single operational command,
NORAD, with an American general
in charge who reported directly to each
government, a Canadian deputy, and a
combined bi-national headquarters at
Colorado Springs.
No sooner had NORAD been established to defend against the bomber,
then the “missile became the message”
and Canada’s strategic importance,
along with the Canadian and American
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air defence systems declined. Our best
bet was deterrence and deterrence
depended on good warning. Ballistic
missiles (whether ICBMs launched
from the USSR or SLBMs fired from
Soviet submarines) aimed at the U.S.
would travel into then beyond the
atmosphere and then sharply down
toward their American targets, arcing above the altitude of Canadian air
space. Unlike the extensive air defence
installations that were once located in
Canada, no system to detect or track
ballistic missiles has ever been located
there or operated by the Canadian military. The US placed its missile warning
radars on its own soil in Alaska, in the
United Kingdom, in Greenland, and in

Another factor that made this situation
viable in NORAD was that during the
Cold War the United States did not
actively deploy a BMD system (except
brief ly in the 1970s, with a single BMD
site). The prevailing view was that a
BMD system could never be effective
and that its very existence, especially
if matched by a Soviet counterpart,
would destabilize the nuclear balance
of power which was based upon an
Assured Destruction capability—that
is, that neither superpower could gain
from a first strike. As arms control
advocates argued, the mere presence
of a BMD capability might tempt one
side to believe a first strike was possible.
In the early 1970s, the U.S. and USSR

American and Canadian personnel monitor activity in the North American maritime and air domains in the
NORAD and U.S. Northern Command command center, Peterson Air Force Base, CO (Credit: Sgt 1st
Class Gail Braymen)

space. Despite this, Canadians remained
involved in the NORAD missile warning role. It is a bit of a puzzle why this
is the case; the quality of Canadian
personnel at Colorado Springs and our
historical defence partnership offer only
a partial explanation. It just may be, as a
senior Canadian defense official mused
before a Canadian parliamentary committee in 2000, that Americans simply
have developed a comfortable “habit”
of working with Canadians in continental defense.

signed the Antiballistic Missile Defense
Treaty limiting BMD systems. While
the Soviets deployed two BMD sites,
the U.S. eventually dismantled its only
BMD site. Canada welcomed this U.S.
position on BMD and indeed in the
1968 renewal of the NORAD agreement insisted that a clause be added
which stated that participation in the
bi-national command not obligate it to
be involved in missile defence.
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Flight test of a three-stage Ground-Based Interceptor from Vandenberg Air Force Base, CA, 26 January
2013 (Credit: Missile Defense Agency, U.S. Department of Defense).

In 1983, President Ronald Reagan
launched his Strategic Defense
Initiative (SDI), and Canada was again
faced with having to make an uncomfortable decision about NORAD
and missile defense. SDI envisioned,
amongst other things, space-based
BMD interceptors (hence the pejorative
appellation “Star Wars”). When Canada
was asked by the Reagan administration if it wanted to officially participate
in SDI research, it declined, but there
was no damage to NORAD or overall
U.S.-Canada defense relations. Indeed,
in 1985, the U.S. and Canada agreed
to modernize NORAD’s air defence
capabilities, in part to deal with a new
air threat: cruise missiles. In the end,
Reagan’s program ran into strong public and Congressional opposition and
the BMD issue faded away again as the
Cold War ended.
In the late 1990s, due to fears about
North Korean and Iranian missile
programs, the Clinton administration,
this time pressed by Congress, moved
to develop limited BMD capabilities
to match the new limited threat. But
the White House was not enthusiastic
about forging ahead with an extensive and expensive “National Missile
Defense” (NMD) system. Concern
about the future of NORAD in
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these years centered on the declining
strategic relevance of traditional air
defence, as the numbers of radar stations
(only just recently modernized) and
interceptor aircraft were cut back
to bare minimums.
This was the situation on September 11,
2001 when, with the Canadian Deputy
Commander in charge, the order went
out: “Generate! generate! generate!”
But NORAD was not postured to deal
with threats coming from inside the
continent. In the days that followed,
fighter aircraft on alert were deployed
to 26 sites in the contiguous U.S.,
with a goal of providing 20-minute
coverage of potential targets, including major cities. Though this extensive

deployment was subsequently scaled
back, NORAD has occasionally
provided coverage for special events
in both the U.S. and Canada, such as
the 2010 Vancouver Olympic Games
and the G8/G20 summits. In addition,
with American homeland security
and defence assuming greater importance, the United States established a
new unified command to cover North
America, U.S. Northern Command
(USNORTHCOM), whose commander also serves as commander of
NORAD. Canada was approached
by the Pentagon about converting
NORAD into something bigger,
a comprehensive North American
defense arrangement but declined,
electing instead to establish its own
homeland defense arrangements.
In the post-9/11 war on terrorism,
the George W. Bush administration
renewed efforts for an NMD system. It abrogated the U.S.-U.S.S.R.
Antiballistic Missile Defense Treaty
in late 2001 and deployed a limited
missile defense of the United States.
Again, Canada was approached to
participate and in 2004 the government
of Prime Minister Paul Martin agreed
that NORAD could support the new
missile defense system. But a year later
when the Bush administration asked if
Canada would directly participate in
BMD operations, the Martin government declined, yielding to public
sentiment which remained suspicious of
BMD and highly critical of the policies

In the wake of 9/11… the
Canadian government undertook
a wide range of efforts to
strengthen its internal security
and worked with the U.S. to
secure the border between the
two countries.
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The newly elected Conservative
government of Prime Minister
Stephen Harper was able to renew
the NORAD agreement in 2006
including an expansion of the
Command’s mission to include
maritime warning.
of George W. Bush. Beyond allowing
NORAD to provide warning information to the interceptor missiles, Canada,
and thus NORAD remains uninvolved
in BMD.
To be sure, Ottawa does not wish to be
a security liability to the U.S. in the war
on terrorism. That war is Canada’s war
too. In the wake of 9/11, not only did
Canada immediately deploy forces to
Afghanistan, where they remained for
over a decade, the Canadian government undertook a wide range of efforts
to strengthen its internal security and
worked with the U.S. to secure the
border between the two countries. As a
July 2005 State Department Background
Note on Canada observed: “While law
enforcement cooperation and coordination were excellent prior to the
terrorist attacks on the United States of
September 11, they have since become
even closer ... U.S.-Canada bilateral
and multilateral cooperation in the
fight is unequaled.”
What’s more, the United States has
been prepared to accommodate continuing Canadian aversion to bilateral
cooperation in BMD. The newly
elected Conservative government of
Prime Minister Stephen Harper was
able to renew the NORAD agreement
in 2006 including an expansion of the
Command’s mission to include maritime warning. Moreover, unlike all
the previous renewals, this one has no
expiry date.
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In NORAD, then, Canada and the
US appear to have established a firm,
perennial institution with f lexibility
enough to accommodate asymmetries
in command at Colorado Springs.
While Canada does not participate
in the operation of missile defences,
Canadians in NORAD support the
system by providing warning and
assessment of any potential missile
attack. This arrangement can lead to
some oddities at Colorado Springs. For
example, a Canadian general officer in
command of NORAD would be able
to confirm that North America is under
missile attack and provide the warning, but must leave it to an American to
release the BMD interceptors.
However, notwithstanding the 2006
renewal and accommodation, the
Canadian decision to stay out of BMD
still leaves NORAD’s future as a binational command in jeopardy. This
is because, as James Fergusson of the
University of Manitoba points out
in his 2010 book Canada and Ballistic
Missile Defence, 1954-2009, “NORAD’s
early warning mission appear[s] at risk
of becoming a redundancy.” Known
as Integrated Tactical Warning and
Assessment or “ITT/WA,” wherein air
and missile warning and attack assessment functions are brought together,
early warning is at the very heart of
NORAD’s mission. And very recently,
the stakes have been raised. The Obama
administration’s policy reversal on

BMD and Secretary Hagel’s announcement of an expansion of the system
indicates a new seriousness about missile defense that highlights the differences between Washington and Ottawa
on BMD. If the U.S. proceeds with a
more extensive BMD system, the existing accommodations within NORAD
to the continued Canadian aversion to
BMD may not be possible nor in the
United States’ best interest. Americans
may in other words get over their habit
of cooperating with Canadians and
decide to effectively gut NORAD by
unilaterally taking ITT/WA away from
the bi-national command.

Giving Up the
Anti-BMD Habit
Today, the Harper government has
given no indication that it is considering pulling its own about face on BMD.
But as the Obama administration and
its successor move forward in expanding America’s ability to intercept
missiles, Ottawa may have no choice
if it wishes to maintain NORAD as
a permanent and relevant substantive
and symbolic fixture of AmericanCanadian security cooperation. The
price of sustaining the United States
habit of cooperating with Canada in
matters of continental defense is that
Canadians give up their habit of rejecting ballistic missile defense. Given the
stakes involved, it seems a small price
to pay.
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